A Short Application of Machiavelli To The Wagner Mutiny

 by Alec Bradpiece

 

Yevgeny Prigozhin
(Wiki Commons) 

Putin has long been described as the archetypal “Machiavellian” leader and for great reason. His emphasis on strong leadership and use of cunning and manipulative tactics (the assassination of political enemies comes to mind) means that the Wagner mutiny of June 23rd came as a surprise to many… or did it?

On the 23rd of June, the Wagner group, a state-funded private military contracting agency, launched a rebellion against the Putin regime. In an unprecedented move, the Wagner group (under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin) seized control of the significant city of Rostov-on-Don before marching an armoured column up toward Moscow-in doing so, inflicted serious damage on a number of Russian military units.

But what, I hear you ask, is the relevance of a 16th-century writer called Machiavelli?  Niccolò Machiavelli was a renaissance philosopher, historian, renowned author and political scientist who is the father of the political concept Machiavellianism. I aim to apply the ideas he sets out in his famous book “The Prince” to the Wagner Mutiny. The Prince is the perfect classical work to apply to the Wagner mutiny due to its focus on the waxing and waning nature of power, statesmanship and warcraft in times of crisis. 

The first (and arguably the most obvious) application of Machiavelli's “The Prince” to the Wagner mutiny comes from his musings over the use of mercenaries in war. Mercenaries, for those who are unfamiliar, are professional soldiers hired to fight for a country who fight for any state or nation without regard to political interests or issues. Machiavelli was deeply sceptical of mercenaries arguing that they were difficult to trust given that they were motivated solely by financial gains. This is a key factor (in my belief) behind the Wagner mutiny. The main motivation of the Wagner force comes from the financial gain they get from fighting- as such, when attacked (albeit inadvertently) by Russian artillery, they have little moral obligation to remain attached to the Russian war in Ukraine. It is clear that there is a lack of moral conviction in their operations in Ukraine- indeed this was displayed by the ease with which the Wagner group rebelled- and this only catalysed Wagner's propensity to rebel. It is clear that Machiavelli's judgment, that mercenaries are hard to rely on given their lack of extrinsic motivation, is portrayed by the Wagner rebellion. 

In addition to moral conviction, I would argue that Machiavelli was correct in arguing against the use of mercenaries due to their lack of loyalty towards a country's institutions and leadership- in this case, Putin and the team behind the war in Ukraine. It is vital to pay attention to the composition of the Wagner forces that mutinied. A significant proportion of these troops are convicted criminals and as such, have grievances with the Russian state and by extension, Vladimir Putin. It is easy (in retrospect) to understand, therefore, why the Wagner mutiny gained momentum so quickly. Of course, it is of no surprise that, when offered a viable opportunity to rebel against the institutions that incarcerated these men, that they seized it with open arms. 

Indeed, one could extend the previous argument to the willingness of the Russian people to support the mutiny. Machiavelli asserted that a ruler should be sure to spread power evenly throughout their territory and to remain aware of the public's expectations. The historic concentration of Russian political, economic and military power in Moscow was a long term factor that galvanised public support for the mutiny and bolstered its threat to the Putin regime. The long term distance (both geographical and social) from the Russian capital has arguably exacerbated the effects of wartime apathy on the Russian population. This apathy has led increasingly to discontent from the general population which arguably led Prigozhin to believe he was Jus Ad Bello “Just to war”. When applying the principles of Machiavelli to this, it is arguable that had the Putin regime spread its power evenly throughout Russia, they would’ve been able to ensure a stricter version of authoritarianism which, in turn, may have been able to dispel the very possibility of a rebellion against it. 

Furthermore, the very fact that the rebellion occurred is indicative of the fact that Putin is no longer the feared man he once was. Arguably a primary reason for this is his failure in Ukraine. His failure in Ukraine has highly undermined Putin's credibility among the elite, the general population, and even within his own military. Machiavelli stressed the importance of maintaining a successful and powerful image as a ruler, as it instils fear and commands respect (without which effective governance was nearly impossible in Machiavelli’s time). The Wagner mutiny can be seen as a manifestation of this loss of credibility. The rebels, who were part of a state-funded private military contracting agency have witnessed firsthand the shortcomings and strategic failures of the Russian military in Ukraine. This will have inevitably eroded their trust and confidence in Putin's leadership, leading them to question his ability to protect their interests. This questioning arguably made it more feasible for the Wagner rebels to decide to act against the regime. 

It is an indubitable fact that the general population's perception of Putin's leadership has also been influenced by the events in Ukraine. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia, coupled with the negative international attention, have resulted in economic hardships and a decline in living standards for Russians of every social status. As a result, public support for Putin and his regime has waned, and the public support for the Wagner mutiny can be seen as a reflection of this growing discontent that has been a byproduct of Putin failing to be the archetypal “Machiavellian” leader.

It is clear that with regard to the Wagner mutiny, the timeless wisdom of Machiavelli illuminates the intricacies of power dynamics and leadership challenges. In this brief analysis, I have glimpsed into the relevance of Machiavelli's principles and their application to the mutiny that shook the Putin regime.