War in 2030

 by Diarmuid Bailey

British combat drone (Wiki Commons)

Why from the US point of view rather than GB?

The ability to predict the future of war is a difficult one.  No single country has the ability to know where, when or why they are going to be fighting a war, not even the world's largest power, the United States. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates said “We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayagues to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq and more- We had no idea that a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.”His admonition that analysts have constantly failed for decades to predict where, why, and how the United States forces would be employed in less than 6 months should be heeded. The exploration of the future of warfare should be completed with a stable force at the centre for which the United States is for BluFor (Nato and Allies). Recently the United Kingdom fell into the category of a second tier military as its power and ability to respond has decreased with a smaller quantity of assets due to a lower budget than its allies. With this we must see the cycle of any great military power and whilst the UK has reached a low point the United States is getting to a stable point which is why it is best to use it as a case study in an inquiry to the future of warfare. 

Definitions: What exactly do we mean by future of warfare

Before approaching the: Who, What, Where, Why and How, of the future of warfare, we must first start by defining what we mean by Warfare and what is the future? Warfare can refer to any sort of conflict, terrorism, gray-zone attempts, large-scale conventional operations or full on nuclear exchanges. Traditionally, political science imposes a set standard to define wars which confine us to look at casualty figures which, at their best, are hypothetical and therefore these standards can’t be observed easily.  Subsequently, we set out a new definition from Clausewitzian of what warfare is. According to Clausewitz ‘An act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’ is all warfare really is, it requires that war be a deliberate and coercive act carried out against an adversary. This definition does not require statistics of damage to assets or loss of lives which, in a theatre with increasing volume of cyber methods and use of lawfare, is key in understanding the development that a military may take. Defining the future proves much easier when separated from the war aspect but the window of future is different for the aim of any study. The timeframe I am using is 8 years to align with the paper published by the RAND Corporation titled ‘The future of Warfare in 2030’. This timeline allows for the analysis of technical developments, whilst not getting into the realms of science fiction, but also changes in size of the militaries to be accurate and data to be manageable with the current view of strategy and aims of fighting wars. Through the use of a course of studies there is enough data from the RAND Project’s sources from more than 120 different government, military, academic and policy experts from more than 50 different institutions in: Belgium, China, Germany, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Poland, UAE, United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, for their perspectives on regional and global trends that might shape the future of conflict between now, in 2023, and 2030.

Who and Why

From the office of Carter all the way through to Biden the list of the United State’s adversaries has remained the same. Despite the efforts by different presidential administrations over the past decades to bring various enemies to becoming allies the US’s adversaries only rarely disappear as a strategic challenge to the plan of US deployments. Looking forward, it is evident that all 5 key actors mentioned in the National Defense Strategy will remain a threat to the United State’s interests for the many decades to come for a host of geopolitical, military, nuclear, economic, and environmental reasons.  China and Russia, the only high-tier militaries that threaten the US, view the current international order as being dominated by the United States and want to change that to a world where they have more power and authority over the world stage. Both countries self-defined regional areas of influence butt up against those of the United States and its allies in key places, such as Taiwan and the East and South China Seas, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The conflict over territory, whilst currently only political, in the future could turn into a conventional war where we see China and Russia in a better position ,militarily, to compete with the United States. China’s hostilities are driven by the requirement to acquire new sources of raw materials to drive its economic development and will seek these resources in different parts of the globe. As a result of this and other trade conflicts, economic rivalries will likely increase and with it feed the security competition between the developing powers. This links China to the US’s asymmetric opponents North Korea and Iran. As these two powers develop and become larger threats for the US their governments struggle to stay secure. This instability can lead to absent state collapse or regime change which, whilst historically rare events, cause unrest at greater levels through the population. Iran and North Korea, like China and Russia, want to exert more influence in their respective regions in ways that conflict with US interests. However, unlike Russia and China, neither Iran or North Korea can militarily challenge the United States directly which leads to the problem of Nuclear conflicts and the constant threat of nuclear destruction on the United States. Despite President Obama's attempt to resolve the Iranian nuclear program ,through the use of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran continues to conduct missile tests and provide support for its proxy forces in Yemen and Syria after the agreement was signed.  The final adversary that the United States faces is terrorism. The sustained US counterterrorism effort has been raging since 2001 but despite this terrorist groups in general will continue to threaten  US interests throughout the next decade. The National Intelligence Council and ODNI predicts that “The threat from terrorism will expand in the coming decades as the growing prominence of small groups and individuals use new technologies, ideas and relationships to their advantage.” Many predict that the Sunni-Shi’a schism will intensify, which could drive Islamic terrorism. Finally, states in the developing world will have to cope with protracted political, economic and environmental challenges and public discontent is likely to continue to fuel terrorism. These factors will also weaken the governments making counterterrorism operations and general law and order more difficult to maintain. Whilst the US can count on having the same opponents in 2030 as it does today its allies are much more unpredictable and the increasing liberalism in Europe leading to less focus on military development could leave the US alone in terms of ideology and power causing the control it has to decrease and making its adversaries much more formidable forces.

How

There are four main archetypes of conflicts for the future that come up in the different studies for the types of conflict the United States could face. Firstly, the United states will face a continued counterterrorism fight. As already mentioned the middle east will become more unstable in the coming years as a result of climate change and the effects it has on their environments. The United States and its allies could face what ODNI are predicting “ An increasingly automized jihadist militancy” that utilises advances in communication technology and the proliferation of conventional weaponry to wage a low-level global terrorist campaign. Consequently the United States will have to maintain their ability to find, target and execute these cells before they attack any. Secondly, the United States will face a gray-zone fight. The definitions of gray-zone vary but China, Russia, North Korea and Iran have all sought to achieve national objectives through the use of coercion short of armed conflict, often by exploiting US and allied thresholds for response. In most cases, this involves the use of covert, civilian or proxy forces, however gray-zone fights do not always involve kinetic force at all, instead relying on intelligence warfare, economic manipulation or cyber tools to achieve such objectives. Iran, China and Russia have all used these tools to their advantage and it is expected that these types of conflict will increase into 2030 for two reasons. First these tools have been proved to be effective and cheap, giving little reason for adversaries to stop using them. Second, the United States might be more vulnerable to this form of warfare as the United States and its liberal democratic allies will be increasingly susceptible to lawfare, false accusations and cyber attacks. With the greater proliferation of social media it will be harder to control the narrative behind military operations and potentially create more vulnerabilities that the US adversaries can exploit. Thirdly the United States could face an asymmetric fight, especially if the US opts for a conventional engagement with either Iran or North Korea over the next decade. Neither of these countries can match the power of the United States military; instead the US will face numerically large but qualitatively inferior conventional forces. The military challenges of these adversaries test their capabilities, in particular their anti-air and anti-ship weapons and their ability to use missiles, weapons of mass destruction and cyber weapons in attack on primarily nonmilitary targets. Finally, the United States probably faces a high-end fight with either Russia or China. With the increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific war against China looks maritime focused and will look different from a land based strategy in Europe. Neither of these powers replicates the advantages of the US military however both will most likely be fighting on homeground and therefore have that advantage with local numerical superiority and a nearing qualitative edge. The production of the J-20 for China and the launching of the Fujian carrier the ability of the United States to outperform China on its technical abilities is rapidly decreasing and China poses a larger threat to the US than Russia will do purely due to the lack of any advantage in the outbreak of war between the two sides. Both Russia and China have the ability to fight in all domains of defence including air, space and cyber where the US had key advantages in all its modern campaigns. This means that the US will have to reassess its position on the world stage and how it can fight a modern war with the problems in its strategy and assets for a potential conflict with capable adversaries. How the US will combat this declining quantitative and qualitative advantage is significant. During World War II the US relied on a quantitative advantage to propel it to victory. By contrast, during the Cold War the United States pinned its hopes on maintaining a qualitative advantage against the Soviet bloc, first through Nuclear missiles and later a ‘basket of technologies’ such as precision weapons, night vision and global positioning to offset the Soviet numbers.  The US and its Allies have been losing power and this means that it loses advantages. The US share of GDP has been shrinking, along with NATO the US allied forces made up for 78.2% of GDP in 1990 now it is only 57.9%. This decrease has led to less and less spending on military programs and companies. Out of the top 100 global defence companies in 1990  only 19 still exist today. In 1960 there were 11 advanced military fixed wing aircraft manufacturers as main contractors with the US; today, there are only three: Lockheed, Boeing and Northrup Grumman. This decline in development has meant that the readiness of the American military power is decreasing and with it its ability to respond to the necessary threats across the world. The US military's ability to fight is fixed, it lacks the ‘agility, flexibility and adaptability’ that the National Defense Strategy are looking for that its adversaries have and wield with great power.  

Where

The location of where conflict might occur is, in comparison to opponents, easy to work out. There are three major regions of interest for the US: Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Going into more specific locations then proves difficult for the military planners, even ordering these locations proves challenging for all forces around the world. In the 2018 National Defense Strategy review the US said “Deterring aggression in three key regions- Indo-Pacific, Europe and Middle East”. To the US the Indo-Pacific is the key location which is understandable. North Korea, Russia, China and Terrorist groups are all militarily active in the Indo-Pacific which makes conflict in the Indo-Pacific  the “Most dangerous scenario to the United States”. Asia is preparing itself for conflict in the region; military spending across the region is up by 59% from 2008, defence expenditure is up by 110 percent, Indonesia, Cambodia and Bangladesh all raised their defence budgets more than China have done, and Vietnam, The Philippines, India and Pakistan have raised their defence budgets by 40%. This increase in spending has two implications: First, Asian countries are sufficiently concerned about the prospects of future conflict to trade domestic spending for defence spending; second, if there was a war, it portends to be a bloody one due to the sheer amount of arms in the region. Of all three locations, the United States has been most active in the Middle East in the last decade. Conflict in Afghanistan ended in 2021 for the American and coalition forces and the continued instability in the region makes it a likely candidate for the start of a kinetic conflict. Firstly the US had been fighting in the region since before 2001 and despite many attempts from presidential administrations it took 20 years and 900,000 deaths before the US removed itself from the region. Secondly, the physical caliphate of the Islamic State has been removed but the region is still highly contested after the Iraq War, Arab Spring and the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. Islamic jihadist terrorism also remains in the area which is a target for the United States and therefore a reason to reenter the region. Due to the effects of Climate Change the Middle East is going to become more volatile as the resources become scarce and the migratory effects of Climate Change take effect. The region is going to become harder to operate in as well as a result of the increased temperatures. Jets will become less effective and so will soldiers in the heat. It is crucial that the US keeps the focus of war outside of the region due to the limited operational capabilities it has there. Finally Europe is also becoming of more concern especially after the Russian invasion into Ukraine and continued aggression in the Black Sea. Russia is a potentially dangerous foe to the United States, with its professionalising military, modernising nuclear arsenal and a proven willingness to use force; the ability of Russia to strike NATO allies forces the United States to become more involved and potentially pushed into conflict in mainland Europe. This preparedness of Russia to engage militarily will provide uncertain grounds for the United States as it attempts to sanction Russian activity with limited effect on the Russian movements and impact on war. The continued Russian aggression in the Black Sea and Atlantic regions against NATO navies shows the power stretch they are aiming for. Russia is testing the constraints and preparedness of the NATO powers which cause more tensions between them and therefore the likelihood of kinetic war in Europe increases. Whilst not as dangerous as in the Indo-Pacific war in Europe would have a greater economic impact than the Middle East and cause strains in the partnerships between the European countries and the United States causing it to be listed above the Middle East. Whilst the exact location is unknown the climate in which the United States soldiers will be expected to fight is certain to be unpredictable and extreme. As the climate heats up weather patterns are becoming more extreme and more unpredictable leading to the battlefields being harsher and therefore a different force for militaries to operate in. The knowledge of the location of engagements should allow for the preparation of subtable technologies that allow for the ability to adjust to each environment and strategically make use of the advantage of quality that the United States military currently has.  

The future of warfare for the United States is difficult to answer and understand. As time progresses we will get technological advancements through the use of AI and robotic systems being integrated into the battlefield. The topic of technology is an entirely different argument as the strategy and knowledge of where and what you will be fighting in the future is so much more crucial as it means you learn what you need to fight with so you can develop the technologies. The future of warfare in 2030 cannot be reduced into; the rise of China, or the decline of liberal economic order; no matter how significant each of these factors are, the central lesson of how to avoid falling into the trap of so many previous failed attempts to predict the future of warfare might be to expand the expectations of war to cover the different scenarios rather than creating a war you are not ready to fight. The BluFor strategies should build off of an ability to adapt to the situations when they arise and be flexible with the assets you have in order to use them to their full potential and greatest effectiveness. The future of war could lie in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific but no matter how far away the war is it is a requirement that we be prepared for it, as it will come.

Bibliography:

• RAND Project Air Force- The future of Warfare in 2030

• “What Xi Jinping Wants” The Atlantic

• Prospects for the European Defence - Royal United Services Institute

• Defense One- May 26, 2016

• National Security Strategy of the USA- White House