Gallipoli - A Winnable War?

 by Sophie Haworth

The Gallipoli Campaign of 1915-1916 was a series of First World War offensives fought over access to the Dardanelles Straits in modern Turkey, aiming to cut Asia off from the Ottoman Empire. Access to the key waterway was a significant advantage, allowing Russia (then a British ally) to directly supply the Allies with logistical or military support via its coastline. It would also significantly weaken the Ottoman Empire by not only severing them from the Asian sector of their territory but also leaving the capital, Constantinople, vulnerable to Allied bombardment. The operation was plagued by military mistakes, variable weather and inhospitable terrain. It is also evident that the Allied Forces were simply not prepared for the Turkish response; the events of this campaign are often seen by the Turks as a defining moment for the birth of their modern nation. Though easy to criticise, were the Allied mistakes entirely to blame for their crushing loss in Gallipoli?

At first, the Allies attempted to control the straits through naval dominance alone. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed a naval campaign to secure the Dardanelles in November 1914, after significant battles in the Western Front. However, they severely underestimated the power and preparation of the Turkish forces; the Ottomans had various defensive forts and armouries lining the coast, and were able to defend the peninsula. The British sent obsolete warships to bombard the forts, but many ships were sunk or damaged by enemy shelling, causing mass casualties. They also lost multiple submarines, although one, commanded by OP Norman Holbrook, successfully went under five rows of mines, sinking a Turkish ship and returning without casualties. Holbrook became the first submariner to be awarded the Victoria Cross. The Ottoman forces had planted many of these waterborne minestrips which damaged several other vessels. For example, the French ship Bouvet sank due to mines in just two minutes, with 643 mortalities. Though some Marines were able to land almost unopposed, the naval operation was largely unsuccessful in securing the straits on its own, and required military assistance. It can be argued that with better ships and intelligence, many fatalities and errors could have been avoided in this sector of the operation, however, the outcome was determined by the significantly advantageous ground position that the Ottomans held over the key waterways.

Thus, after these initial naval attempts to clear the straits, the first troop landings occurred on the peninsula on the 25th of April 1915. The first two landings were at Cape Helles, on the very tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and at what became known as ANZAC Cove, where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps landed. The aim of these landings was to control the land up to the hill of Achi Baba within 24 hours, forcing Ottoman Troops out of the peninsula. This was significantly optimistic, especially considering that Allied troops were unsuccessful in ever reaching this point throughout the entire operation. The ANZAC troops were not meant to arrive at what became ANZAC cove (pictured); the landing spot was never reached due to navigational error, leaving the landing troops incredibly vulnerable to bombardment. In fact, the planned landing location was further south, where the terrain is less inhospitable and the troops would have had fewer ridges to scale. ANZAC cove is essentially a horse shoe shape, with mountainous terrain and multiple ridges surrounding the incoming infantries, far less suitable for a successful landing. Ottoman forces were stationed across the ridges, gunning down the Allied forces as they made it to the beaches from their landing craft. Casualties were massive, and chaos ensued, with widespread disorganisation stemming from the unforeseen problems. The terrain change made all the difference - not only were the Allies entirely hemmed in by the coastline, fully visible to the Ottoman troops, but the subsequent chaotic events were significantly impacted by the dense and unfamiliar terrain that the troops were not prepared for. 

The topography of the Peninsula played an integral role in the outcome of the campaign. The terrain is undulating - the tallest point on Achi Baba pushes 600 feet above sea level, with the whole peninsula being surrounded by various beaches and waterways. (The beaches on the peninsula are simply referred to as ‘W’, ‘X’, ‘Y’, ‘V’ and ‘S’ beach - and are depicted on the left). Thick undergrowth made advances challenging, and varying ravines and hills (such as shown below) proved to be tactically difficult to take. Throughout the campaign, the Ottomans occupied the high ground, leaving the invading forces with a continuous military disadvantage. This had a significant impact on the outcomes of the campaign; the Allies were often fighting from a critically exposed position, severely weakening their forces and chances of success. The geography of the area had a detrimental impact on the success of the initial landings, further worsened by the incorrectly calculated landings. In this way, it can be argued that the Gallipoli landings were never likely to succeed, as the Allied chances were severely limited from the start. 

However, there were also significant military shortcomings during the campaign. Throughout the duration of the operation, multiple troop landings occurred in the daytime, leaving the emergent forces unprotected in the light. Consequently, many landings were disastrous, with soldiers decimated as they headed for the beaches. Those who successfully made it to the shore in the various operations were then greeted by not only the Ottomans but chaotic scenes within their own ranks. Due to the mass casualties before reaching the coast, many soldiers lost their commanders and the general consensus of the military action was mis-coordinated and uncommunicated. The disruption to the chain of command was what arguably caused the most mayhem; remaining officers didn’t want to move forward with the advance without previous approval from their superiors, for fear of reprimand and repercussions if their initiative was unsuccessful. This fundamental problem with the military setup can be blamed for causing further casualties due to the indecision. Furthermore, in specific missions, such as in advances on land near Suvla Bay, infantries were never provided with maps of the area, practically making their task impossible. Insufficient understanding of the local area and lack of proper reconnaissance significantly increased the challenge posed to the already faltering Allied forces, and better preparation would have lessened the struggles of the campaign, improving the chances of successfully capturing the waterway. 

It is also important to note the poor infrastructure supporting the troops who made it to land; the fluctuating climate of the area (causing problems ranging from heatstroke to hypothermia) was not adequately prepared for, with restricted access to clean drinking water and other hygiene essentials in the camp. This caused avoidable fatalities and evacuations as preventable diseases spread rapidly in the forces’ setup. To worsen these problems, many men were stationed in Cairo in Egypt prior to their deployment in Turkey, and had picked up sexual diseases from brothels in the city. This, and all the other ranging medical issues (dysentery, trench foot and lice etc) added to the significant challenges faced by the troops, reducing their effectiveness in combat. 

Though a vast array of mistakes were made throughout the operation, which significantly impacted the actual outcome of events, the shortcomings did allow the military to improve their offensive tactics in later battles. By the end of the conflict, the Army had adapted their landing tactics, bringing troops in on extended, temporary pontoons under the cover of darkness, reducing the time they were exposed in slow moving landing craft and kept the soldiers dry, allowing them to be ready to fight as soon as they reached the shore. Additionally, the Army had set up several hospital bases in Lemnos, Alexandria and Malta with a combined total of 74,000 permanent beds to treat the sick and wounded. More permanent infrastructure had been set up, such as wells, reducing unnecessary casualties and improving hygiene. However, these advances had come too little too late, and the operation had effectively been lost by the time they came into effect. Arguably, though they addressed issues, these changes would have had little effect on the actual outcome of the campaign.

Overall, it is clear that the events of the Gallipoli Campaign created a near perfect storm, in which military mistakes were exacerbated by the challenging and volatile terrain of the Peninsula. Further worsened by the strength of the Ottoman opposition, the Allied forces faced a literal uphill battle in order to occupy the territory, which was arguably an impossible task from the start. Though it is evident that an array of military errors significantly impacted the events of the campaign, they were not the deciding factor in its outcome. The confinement of the coves and beaches created the ideal environment for Ottoman domination, striking evermore weakening blows to the forces before successful landings were completed. In conclusion, it is apparent that the geography of the Peninsula was far more impactful in the failure of the operation than military shortcomings, signalling that the outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign was largely determined from the start due to the Turkish conditions. 

With thanks to the Gallipoli Association, especially John White and Julian Whippy, for the opportunity to visit the Turkish Peninsula and learn about the events first hand. For any more information about the Gallipoli Campaign, please see Home - The Gallipoli Association (gallipoli-association.org) Also thanks to Mr Sadden for helping me find out about OPs!