Private Prisons: Making Crime Pay

by Felix Johnson

Privatisation of prisons began in 1990s, under Tony Blair, a sign that he had truly abandoned the principles of Clause IV, which dedicated the Labour Party to nationalisation of industry. Starting from just the one, HMP Altcourse, there are now 14 privately managed prisons in the UK. However, their supposed benefits may have yet to be seen, while their failures remain clear and unavoidable. Furthermore, is turning incarceration into an industry of profit a sensible or defensible idea?

Evidence supporting privatised British prisons seems limited to a 2013 report from a right-leaning think tank, Reform, titled: The Case for Private Prisons. It claimed to find, through an analysis of data from the ministry of justice, that 70% of private prisons had lower reoffending rates than public one, for those serving terms of one year or less. It also found them to perform better in ‘resource management and operational effectiveness’. However, the report has come under a wide range of criticism, from accusations of ‘simplistic analysis’, due to its selective use of data, and ones of bias (both Serco and G4S, who operate multiple prisons, have sponsored past Reform events).

Unfortunately for supporters of private prisons, many fail at the first hurdle. Their main benefits are professed to be their cost effectiveness and efficiency, however private prisons have a higher cost per inmate. This could be defended as showing that private prisons take better care or inmates by investing more into their rehabilitation, however private prisons also experience high rates of prisoner disturbances and poor results. The desire for profit in the industry has had further disadvantageous and unagreeable effects. Rates of pay are 23% lower than in the public sector, attracting lower quality and less experienced staff. This contributes to the poorer standards of safety in prisons, and the increased rates of drug or contraband usage. The need for ‘efficiency’ has also led to severe overcrowding in at least three prisons, with certain prisons being regarded as almost run by inmates (such as Northumberland). G4S also encourages prisoners to work during their time, stating that it can improve rehabilitation and future employability. However, the benefits of this are not fully proven, and prisoners are only paid £2 a day for a 40-hour week, an arguably exploitative rate (although it could be considered appropriate as punishment for their crimes).

When the motive of running prisons becomes making a profit, the prisoner becomes as product, and the rate of profit is often determined by how many prisoners require imprisoning (as well as lowering costs). This means that the business private prisons is improved by high offending and reoffending rates. Therefore, the motive for private prisons to lower reoffending rates is reduced to simply keeping them at a level which does not result in re-nationalisation. This, particularly in the US, where private prisons are more numerous, could be considered to be contributory the military/prison-industrial complex. This arguably encourages policies that result in high rates of incarceration, particularly for relatively minor crimes, such as substance abuse (without intent to supply). However, this theory lacks hard evidence, and is of little note in Britain.

The dubious evidence in support of private prisons is echoed by the public, with 49% finding themselves uncomfortable, and 23% very uncomfortable with their use in the UK (Populus poll, 2012). Despite the recent plateau in the number of private prisons, with one, Birmingham, even being placed back under government control to its poor standards, two new privately operated prisons are to be built by around 2022. One of these prisons is even being built with public funds before its transfer to private ownership. The issues surrounding private prisons are arguably scandalous, and must be tackled by the government head on before problems worsen, or the scale of their use increases.